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The Moral Authority of Symbolic Appeals
in Biomedical Ethics
SHARON SYTSMA
Ethicists and others grappling with bio-
medical and other ethical issues often
advocate or reject certain practices or
actions on the basis of the symbolic
meanings associated with them. My
project is to call attention to the ubiq-
uity of symbolic appeals and to initiate
an examination of their philosophical
significance, moral authority, and log-
ical limitations. Are appeals to sym-
bolic meanings of actions or policies
legitimate in ethical argumentation
and discourse, or are they emotive
responses and indulgences lacking in
moral significance? If such appeals have
moral weight, how is the symbolic
value balanced with other values? Why
is it that some symbolic appeals are
convincing, and others not? What,
if anything, validates or invalidates
appeals?
To orient the reader properly to the
project, a few preliminary comments
are in order. First, a thorough philo-
sophical investigation of the nature of
symbols and symbolism is outside the
scope of this paper, as is an investiga-
tion of the precise relationship, should
there be one, between symbols and
language, signs, or metaphors. How-
ever, the use of the term “symbol”
and its derivatives will be uncontro-
versial. The arguments that are the
focus of this paper are arguments that
the morality of certain actions and pol-
icies is determined, at least in part, by
the messages they are likely to con-
vey.1 The actions or policies are thought
to send messages because they are
representative of, and thus symbolize
certain attitudes, values, or ideals.
Second, arguments that attribute
symbolic (rather than actual) moral
worth to human beings such as
embryos, anencephalics, or the perma-
nently comatose to justify using them
for instrumental purposes, such as stem
cell research or organ transplantation,
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are also not under consideration.2 Given
that either the assertion or denial of ac-
tual moral significance without further
argument inevitably begs the question,
and because the correct criterion for
moral status is such a contentious is-
sue, such arguments fall beyond the
scope of this paper and cannot be ad-
dressed here.
Third, the “moral authority” of argu-
ments based on symbolic appeals re-
fers here merely to prima facie moral
weight. Symbolic significance counts as
one morally relevant consideration but
not necessarily an overriding one. The
actual moral weight of the symbolic ap-
peal varies from argument to argu-
ment, as do the number and weight of
competing moral considerations.
Evidence of the Ubiquity
of Symbolic Appeals
Most appeals to symbolic meanings
in the bioethical literature are made
with respect to controversial medical
actions, either already established or
under consideration. The arguments I
cite are random representative exam-
ples of such symbolic appeals chosen
to demonstrate their prevalence. No
assessment of their persuasive power
will be given at this point, though
most people will find that they vary
significantly in their levels of co-
gency. The following arguments are
loosely organized here from begin-
ning to end-of-life issues.
John Kass and others have argued
against in vitro fertilization or other
forms of artificial reproductive tech-
nologies, including cloning, because
of the dehumanizing effects of such
practices. The use of artificial repro-
ductive technologies, he argues, is sym-
bolic of an attitude toward children as
property to be manufactured accord-
ing to one’s specifications.3 Those wor-
ried about commercial surrogacy are
worried not just about commodifica-
tion but about what message the sur-
rogates’ own children receive when
their biological mothers give away the
children they have been carrying for
someone else.4
James Burtchaell opposes fetal tis-
sue experimentation when obtained
from elective abortions because it sym-
bolically “places the scientist in moral
complicity with the abortionist.” 5
David Ozar argues that even those
who deny that embryos have a right
to life nevertheless have a reason to
refrain from the thawing and dispos-
ing of unused embryos, given the pos-
sible symbolic impact such a practice
would have on “the community’s valu-
ing of human life.” 6 Meilaender and
others have argued against using em-
bryos for stem cell research urging
the same concern.7
Limitations have been suggested
regarding physician practices on the
basis that they taint or undermine the
symbolic meaning of the medical pro-
fession as the patient’s caring advo-
cate. For this reason, several bioethicists
have argued against physicians acting
as legal executioners.8 Norman Dan-
iels has warned against doctors func-
tioning as gatekeepers to the access of
medical services, for fear that trust in
doctors will be undermined, because
if doctors function as gatekeepers, the
message will be sent that their patients’
health is not their primary concern.9
Many have argued against medical pro-
fessionals participating in euthanasia
or even physician-assisted suicide
because doing so undermines trust in
the medical profession by sending the
message that physicians are guided by
concerns other than the continuation
of life.10
Mark Weitzman has argued against
using Nazi research data even when
cost-effective or scientifically benefi-
cial. He reports that many Jewish peo-
ple think that, in using Nazi data,
medical researchers become “accesso-
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ries to the crime” and relativize “the
sense of absolute evil associated with
Nazism.” 11 A former supporter of the
use of such research, Robert Pozos later
came to condemn it after talking to
concentration camp survivors. He states
that using Nazi data “sends a mes-
sage” that supports the principle that
“the ends justify the means” and thus
condones and encourages scientists to
engage in unethical practices to fur-
ther the ends of medicine.12
At one point, Daniel Callahan argued
against the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration of the perma-
nently comatose or dying because feed-
ing, even artificially, is “the most perfect
symbol of the fact that human life is
inescapably social and communal.” 13
Admitting the intrinsic “moral licit-
ness” of the cessation of artificial feed-
ing in the cases sensibly and carefully
outlined by JoAnne Lynn and James
Childress, Callahan nevertheless op-
posed the cessation of artificial feed-
ing even when futile, nonbeneficial,
and consistent with the patient’s
wishes, because doing so violates the
symbol of feeding as caring and threat-
ens attendant emotions and senti-
ments that Callahan deems “necessary
social instincts” for the survival of a
social community.14
Symbolic appeals have also been
made regarding organ-transplantation
policies. Leon Kass has argued against
the marketing of organs on the grounds
that it sends the false message that
our bodies are our own property and
thus have the status of a commodity.15
Renee Fox has severely criticized what
has been called the “two-minute pro-
tocol” in the use of nonheartbeating
cadavers, maintaining that the prac-
tice encourages an impression of trans-
plant surgeons as “ignoble cannibals.” 16
I have argued that anencephalics
should not be used as organ sources
even though they will die shortly
because the policy of harvesting organs
from anencephalics symbolically under-
mines parental attachments to off-
spring, and threatens to diminish,
through a slippery slope effect, our
respect for the intrinsic worth of
individuals.17
John Lanton, reflecting on his expe-
riences administering cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation (CPR) and noting
its disturbing aspects that call into ques-
tion its appropriateness and morality
in certain circumstances, concludes that
CPR is morally justified.18 He argues
that CPR fulfills a function even if not
directly beneficial to the endangered
or dying person: it functions as a sym-
bol of our respect for persons. The
flurry surrounding CPR, which he calls
“our culture’s desperate dance around
the bed of a dying loved one” and “a
ritual affirmation of our central be-
liefs about the way people should be
treated,” manifests how important a
person’s life is, so that, even if not
beneficial for that person, others attend-
ing the endangered or dying are com-
forted by the fact that everything
possible was done to prevent a per-
son’s death. He states: “Until we come
up with alternative rituals, other ways
of dramatically affirming and valuing
the lives of persons who are sick and
dying, we will need these rituals badly;
even if (or especially when) they are
mostly symbolic.” 19
These examples should suffice to
establish that symbolic appeals are
prevalent in the bioethical literature.
Given their prevalence, it behooves us
to reflect on the reasons why they are
so entrenched in our moral delibera-
tions and to determine whether or how
their use should be encouraged.
Significance of Symbolic
Arguments
Ernst Cassirer claimed that the capac-
ity for symbolism, rather than for ra-
tionality, is the distinguishing feature
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of humankind.20 As animal symboli-
cum, humans transcend the realm of
the practical and enter a new form of
discourse. Symbols are “a part of the
human world of meaning.” 21 Al-
though certain animals possess a re-
markable degree of intelligence, only
humans develop systems of symbol-
ism that are the basis for the devel-
opment of culture as expressed in art,
music, religion, literature, science, and
mathematics. Alfred North White-
head described symbolism as “inher-
ent in the very texture of human life”
and as a necessary means of human
expression.22 He described symbolism
as “the enhancement of the impor-
tance of what is symbolized” and that
it “preserves society by adding emo-
tion to instinct.” 23 Anthropologists and
sociologists have long recognized the
central role symbols play in express-
ing and communicating ideals and val-
ues in social life.24 They have further
recognized the power symbols have
to evoke and cultivate affective re-
sponses necessary for providing co-
hesion and a sense of identity and
meaning.25
Some bioethicists have reflected on
the role of symbols in a meaningful
life. Daniel Callahan, bemoaning the
dearth of an adequate symbolic under-
standing of death, said that “we come
to feel part of a community because
we find its systems of symbols of inter-
pretation and of meaning plausible and
satisfying.” 26 He called symbols “pat-
terns of order and explanation.” 27 Rob-
ert Arnold and Stuart Youngner call
for further reflection on the issue of
changing the “dead donor rule” to
increase the supply of organs for trans-
plantation by noting that the rule sym-
bolizes our concern to refrain from
treating others as body parts. They
state: “Symbols keep us attuned to
what is important. As such they shape
our self-conception and how we orga-
nize our communities.” 28
Renee Fox reports that her training
in psychology, psychiatry, sociology,
and anthropology has long made her
aware of the influence of the symbolic
in our lives. Her work in organ trans-
plantation has only “reinforced [her]
conviction that scientific and medical
progress does not catapult us beyond
the reach of those areas of our being
where nonlogical perceptions, com-
pelling images, reified symbols, and
tenacious myths reside.” 29 In her
“Afterthoughts,” she speaks of the
moral and spiritual ill effects she sees
resulting from our move away from
the conception of organ transplanta-
tion as a gift act. Losing the associa-
tion with that symbol has had a
deleterious and dangerous effect on
our attitudes about the human body
and psyche, regarding them with an
“economically deterministic, utilitar-
ian, profit-oriented, desacralized out-
look.” 30 She points to developments
in the 1990s that affirm her claims —
the arguments for allowing the mar-
keting of organs, the movements
toward the use of nonheartbeating
cadavers, and the practice of infusing
the nearly dead with organ-sustaining
fluids without first securing informed
consent from family members. The
thrust of her argument is to bring out
the importance of awareness of our
symbolic natures as a key factor in
our thinking about biomedical poli-
cies. Without sufficient consideration
of the symbolic elements of our poli-
cies and practices, both past and future,
we can lose control of our intended
goals.
Synthesizing these comments ex-
plains why symbols permeate our exis-
tence and dominate our moral and
aesthetic lives. Symbols effectively
express the values we find central to
the meaning of our existence. They
also confer a sense of identity through
the shared values they represent.
Because they both express values and
Dissecting Bioethics
295
confer a sense of identity, symbols
themselves can help to strengthen the
values they represent and in turn con-
tribute to the quality of human life.
Thus, they have an important ethical
role. In Kantian terms, they can be
used to further the ends of humanity;
in Aristotelian terms, they can contrib-
ute to human flourishing; or, in Utili-
tarian terms, they can promote utility.
The argument requires only two as-
sumptions, whose plausibility ap-
proaches self-evidence: (1) human
beings by nature desire a good life,
and (2) a good life is precisely one we
regard as valuable and meaningful.
Even though symbols can be harmful
and promote evil ends, and therefore
must be subject to scrutiny, it cannot
be denied that they have a moral role.
Therefore, we have a prima facie obli-
gation to respect, adhere to, and pro-
tect symbolic meaning, at least when
doing so contributes to a good life.
So far, it might appear that sym-
bols have, or ought to have, a fixed
and static meaning. Although there is
always a danger that symbolism has
the effect of suppressing creative en-
deavors and limiting our freedom of
thought, that is not how they ought
to be viewed. Cassirer’s point is only
that we are by nature symbolic be-
ings, not that symbolic meanings are
fixed and unalterable. Rather, he main-
tains, “A genuine human symbol is
characterized not by its uniformity but
by its versatility. It is not rigid or
inflexible but mobile.” 31 It is our ca-
pacity for symbolism that makes it
possible to continually and creatively
recreate our sphere of meaning. Sym-
bolism, then, has an evolutionary char-
acter and naturally responds to new
challenges and perceptions. So, al-
though symbols can and often do stag-
nate, corrupt, and enslave our thinking,
our creativity generates new symbols
to accommodate the evolutionary de-
velopment of our linguistic, mathemat-
ical, religious, aesthetic, ethical, and
scientific thought.
Because symbols characteristically
have motivating appeal, their power
for seduction is strong. The seductive
influence can be either beneficial or
dangerous. For this reason, Whitehead
stresses the “necessary service” that
persistent criticism has on the well-
being of culture. Symbolic elements in
life, he says, “have a tendency to run
wild, like vegetation in a tropical for-
est. The life of humanity can easily be
overwhelmed by its symbolic accesso-
ries.” 32 Whitehead concludes: “The art
of a free society consists first in the
maintenance of a symbolic code; and
secondly in fearlessness of revision, to
secure that the code serves those pur-
poses which satisfy an enlightened
reason.” 33
Limitations of Symbolic Arguments
Many symbolic arguments strike us as
last-ditch, desperate efforts to rescue
an opinion, particularly if they sup-
port a position antithetical to our own.
However, even if one is not entirely
convinced by any of the arguments
presented so far, most people will rec-
ognize that some of the arguments are
more plausible than others. The analy-
sis of the previous section has alerted
us to the danger of becoming so
entranced by symbols that we become
stifled and perhaps insensitive or obliv-
ious to the need for changing our hab-
its of thought. Use of symbolic appeals,
then, must be carefully scrutinized in
order that their ability to compre-
hend the full range of meanings is
preserved. To borrow from Socrates,
“an unexamined symbol is not worth
having.”
There are, and can be, no algo-
rithms for the critical examination of
symbolic appeals in biomedical or other
ethical issues, just as there can be no
algorithms for making moral judg-
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ments. Aristotle’s admonition that we
should not expect total precision in
ethics is apt.34 There are too many
contingencies, too many values, and
too many confluences that all must be
balanced in unique situations. No list
of rules can be provided that would
not compound the error of insensitiv-
ity to the particularity and complexity
of situations and events. But just as
symbols have a positive though not
peremptory role, so can a provisional
list of critical questions and remind-
ers. The following critical questions
can be recommended as at least a par-
tial way of raising the issues to another,
higher and hopefully more fruitful
plateau.
Does the Symbolic Appeal Ignore
Particularities of the Situation That Make
the Appeal in that Case Inappropriate?
Symbolic appeals, like the applica-
tions of rules, ought to be sensitive to
special circumstances. Symbols and
rules provide guidance and order, but
we ought not relinquish our auton-
omy to them. It may be a good rule of
thumb to initiate CPR in most emer-
gency situations of cardiac arrest, but
if the patient has ceased breathing for
so long that brain damage is extensive
and certain, CPR may only lead to a
vegetative state from which no recov-
ery is possible. Likewise, providing
CPR to a fragile elderly person in the
advanced stages of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease may be regarded as harmful rather
than beneficial. Symbols should aid
and facilitate our moral judgments —
not prevent them from occurring.35
Does the Action or Policy Advocated
Effectively Symbolize What It Is
Claimed to Symbolize?
Symbols evoke different responses from
different people. A judgment about the
symbolic meaning of a policy requires
an historical intimacy with the so-
ciety —an attunement with the “pulse”
of society. If a policy is to be defended
based on its symbolic meaning, the
situations for which it is called must
be such that the symbolic meaning of
that policy would not backfire by send-
ing an undesirable message. For exam-
ple, in a case where artificial feeding
causes nausea, increases sensitivity to
pain, fails to be beneficial, and pro-
longs life meaninglessly, can its provi-
sion effectively convey a caring attitude,
as Callahan once suggested? Even for
a person in a permanently vegetative
state, can artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion symbolize a caring attitude, when
almost no one would choose to persist
in such a state?36 The symbolic mean-
ing backfires because the message sent
is that healthcare providers are like
robots in their insistence on measures
that really do not constitute genuine
caring.
Does the Particular Symbolic Appeal Fail
to Recognize Other, Even More Plausible
Symbolic Meanings That Might Be
Conveyed by the Action or Policy?
We ought not comfortably support a
policy on the grounds that it serves
one symbolic value, without acknowl-
edging that other values or symbols
are neglected or even violated.37 For
instance, insisting on the gift model of
organ donation on the basis that that
model symbolizes our respect for per-
sonal autonomy neglects to consider
that adopting a “routine harvest” pol-
icy symbolizes solidarity with our fel-
low human beings.38 Or refraining from
administering euthanasia may, to some,
be thought of as necessary in order to
symbolize a respect for life, but for the
dying patient wracked with pain, such
restraint might be symbolic of aban-
donment. Forcing women to have pre-
natal surgeries for the protection of
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their fetuses because of the symbolism
of respect for life might at the same
time be interpreted as a lack of respect
for women and the treatment of them
as mere “fetal containers.” 39 When the
suggested symbolic meanings are mul-
tiple, further arguments must be given
to support either line of approach, and
the plausibility of the different inter-
pretations must be carefully examined.
Does the Symbolic Appeal Ignore
Alternative Ways of Respecting and
Protecting the Values at Issue?
Some have argued against the use of
unethically obtained research data such
as that gathered by the Nazis because
it sends the message that we condone
such practices. However, if such data
could be used for significant life-
preserving purposes, we could devise
ways of doing so that avoid this mes-
sage, such as including statements of
condemnation of the previous research
and dedicating one’s research or prof-
its to Jewish families who have suf-
fered persecution.40
Is the Symbolic Appeal Outdated Insofar
as the Demands of a New Era Call into
Question the Adequacy of Previous
Symbols?
Currently, allowing a patient or a proxy
to refuse or terminate treatment (called
by some “passive euthanasia”) is rec-
ognized as morally permissible and
even as an individual right. Previ-
ously, however, a notion persisted that
doctors, as health and life protectors,
must always use any available tech-
nology to prolong life. Medical ad-
vances have been such that we are all
too capable of prolonging biological
existence —long past the time that life
has any meaning to its bearer. So now,
in our new era, we have the burden of
choices never before shouldered.41 The
slowness with which our legal and
medical institutions responded to the
petition by Karen Ann Quinlan’s fam-
ily to remove her respirator fails to
manifest the “fearlessness of revision”
Whitehead identifies as a necessary
component of the “art of free society.” 42
Does the Symbolic Appeal Justify the
Sacrifice of Actual Needs of Individuals?
This question specifically concerns the
problem of how to weigh appeals to
symbolic value when they compete
with the needs of individuals. Should
symbolic values ever take precedence
over the needs of actual individuals?
To be sure, giving priority to a symbol
over an individual sometimes indi-
cates a rigidity and lack of sensitivity
unbefitting good moral judgment.
Allowing a person to die rather than
tearing up a flag to bind her wounds
would be such an instance.
Arguments from Symbolic Appeals
and Slippery Slopes
Arguments against policies that are
based on symbolic appeals often pro-
ceed not by arguing that the actions or
policies under consideration are in
themselves immoral but by projecting
the deleterious consequences that could
follow as a chain effect from accepting
or rejecting them because of their sym-
bolic value. As such, the symbolic
appeals take the form of slippery slope
arguments. Given that slippery slope
arguments make claims about the
future, they are at best inductive argu-
ments, and they are rarely universally
convincing.
Attitudes toward slippery slope argu-
ments vary considerably. Often, logic
textbooks portray slippery slope argu-
ments as being always fallacious.43
David White, on the other hand, argues
that slippery slope arguments are never
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fallacious, though they might contain
a false premise.44 Others argue that
slippery slope arguments may or may
not be logically fallacious.45 Given the
broad range of persuasiveness exem-
plified in slippery slope arguments,
this latter view seems to be most rea-
sonable. Slippery slope arguments
should be considered fallacious only
when there is no good reason to think
that the degenerative chain reaction of
bad effects will occur. In nonfallacious
slippery slope arguments the pre-
dicted chain effect is not merely logi-
cally possible but plausible. The more
probable it is, the more convincing the
argument will be.
Symbolic appeals have emotive force
because they express values. The
cogency of slippery slope arguments
based on symbolic appeals depends
on two factors relative to their social
contexts: (1) the degree of the emotive
force carried by the symbol, and (2)
the degree of shared meaning the sym-
bol has. Judging cogency then requires
having sufficient familiarity with the
society and its values and other sym-
bols. Some slippery slope arguments
(logical versions) predict morally objec-
tionable future consequences on the
basis that the logical justification of
the original act or policy under con-
sideration is actually applicable to a
wide range of actions or policies,
including some that are clearly mor-
ally disturbing. Other slippery slope
arguments (causal versions) predict
moral decline as a result of psycholog-
ical or causal factors of human nature.
Slippery slope arguments based on
symbolic appeals rely primarily on the
psychological and emotive effects of
the symbolic appeals and therefore fall
into the category of causal slippery
slope arguments.
Even though causal slippery slope
arguments are not completely convinc-
ing, they do serve important func-
tions. Jeffrey Whitman has suggested
that slippery slope arguments serve as
“flags or markers that indicate impor-
tant values are at stake.” 46 They urge
prudence at the onset of a slippery
slope and suggest strategies for pre-
venting them. Sometimes the appro-
priate response to causal slippery slope
arguments is to educate people about
important moral distinctions that can
be made between the suggested pol-
icy and the envisioned consequential
ones, to assure them that the down-
ward slide need not take place. Other
times, preventative strategies such as
the implementation of laws or regula-
tive procedures that can serve as steps
or landings are the best response. These
general tactics for confronting slip-
pery slope arguments in general are
perfectly applicable to the subset of
those arguments based on symbolic
appeals.
Sensitivity to the possibility that our
suggested actions or policies might
have symbolic significance in the minds
of other people or other nations can
be tremendously helpful, especially
when we are also aware of what the
symbolic meanings might be. First, it
can help us to avoid implementing
policies that unnecessarily arouse sus-
picion, distrust, or any other negative
reaction that could motivate an undesir-
able sequence of events when there
are alternative policies available. Sec-
ond, when no alternative routes are
available to a policy that could be
significantly beneficial even when there
is a tendency for it to send negative
messages, sensitivity to symbolic sig-
nificance can help us find ways by
which the risks of those negative mes-
sages might be minimized. We could
frame those policies in ways that will
less likely evoke negative images or
meanings or, if those are inevitable, at
least in ways by which those unavoid-
able negative meanings are diffused,
supplanted, or counterbalanced. Cre-
ating and implementing new symbols
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or policies may be necessary to high-
light the values that the policies are
implemented to realize. Educational
programs may be needed to raise pub-
lic consciousness concerning the actual
value of current policies compared to
new ones. Otherwise, unforeseen or
recalcitrant symbolic meanings might
hinder a policy that would be far more
beneficial than current ones. Indeed,
sometimes the negative emotive power
of a symbolic meaning can be under-
estimated and can necessitate either a
temporary suspension or permanent
reversal of our policies.
Symbolic appeals that have been
shown to be inadequate by the critical
questions identified in the previous sec-
tion would at the very least suffer in
cogency and will likely yield fallacious
arguments because of the factors left out
of consideration that would bear on the
foreseen chain of events. However,
whether they actually do yield falla-
cious arguments cannot be decided sim-
ply by subjecting them to the scrutiny
of those questions. There may be other
reasons why the symbolic effect fails.
Despite certain flaws in slippery slope
arguments, the predicted chain effect can
remain plausible because of the sheer
emotive power that the symbolic ap-
peal has in its particular setting.
In conclusion, symbolic appeals in
bioethics are natural byproducts of our
human makeup. They do have at least
prima facie moral authority, but that
authority must be balanced by other
symbolic meanings and moral factors.
Symbolic appeals are often made in
the form of slippery slope arguments.
Evaluating symbolic appeals, whether
or not they feature in slippery slope
arguments, can be facilitated by exam-
ination in terms of the criteria out-
lined here, although they may not be
resolved on this basis alone. Critical
evaluation is crucial, given that sym-
bolic appeals are effective because they
are affective —that is, they have emo-
tive appeal. As such, they can also be
an effective means to mobilize new
attitudes and evoke subtle, but never-
theless important, values.
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